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Over the past few decades, there has been increasing interest in left-
libertarianism, which holds (roughly) that agents fully own themselves
and that natural resources (land, minerals, air, and the like) belong to
everyone in some egalitarian sense. Left-libertarianism agrees with the
more familiar right-libertarianism about self-ownership, but radically
disagrees with it about the power to acquire ownership of natural
resources. Merely being the first person to claim, discover, or mix labor
with an unappropriated natural resource does not—left-libertarianism
insists—generate a full private property right in that natural resource.
Left-libertarianism seems promising because it recognizes both strong
individual rights of liberty and security and also grounds a strong
demand for some kind of material equality. It seems, that is, to be a plau-
sible a form of liberal egalitarianism.
In a recent review essay of a two-volume anthology on left-
libertarianism (edited by two of us), Barbara Fried has insightfully laid
out most of the core issues that confront left-libertarianism.1 We are each
left-libertarians, and we would like to take this opportunity to address
some of the general issues that she raises. We shall focus, as Fried does
much of the time, on the question of whether left-libertarianism is a
well-defined and distinct alternative to existing forms of liberal egalitar-
ianism. More specifically, we shall address the following fundamental
issues raised by Fried (and others): (1) Does the notion of self-ownership
have any determinate content? (2) What is the relation between self-
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ownership and world ownership? (3) How is left-libertarianism different
from other forms of liberal egalitarianism (e.g., those of Rawls and
Dworkin)?
First, however, we shall set the context by providing some general
background on left-libertarianism.
I. Background
Left-libertarianism is a theory of justice that (like right-libertarianism)
grounds justice in moral (as opposed to legal) property rights. Left-
libertarianism rests on two central claims: (1) full initial self-ownership
for all agents, and (2) egalitarian ownership of natural resources. Agents
are full self-owners just in case they own themselves in the same way that
they can fully own inanimate objects. Stated slightly differently, full self-
owners own themselves in the same way that a (full) chattel-slave-owner
owns a slave.2 We shall explain this notion more carefully in the next
section.
The second core claim of left-libertarianism is that natural resources
are owned by all in some egalitarian manner. Natural resources are those
things that have no moral standing (e.g., are not sentient) and have not
been transformed by any non-divine agent. Thus, land, seas, air, miner-
als, and so forth in their original (humanly unimproved) states are
natural resources, whereas such things as chairs, buildings, and land
cleared for farming are not. All left-libertarians agree that the ownership
of natural resources is governed by an egalitarian principle, although
there is some disagreement as to whether it is the current value of these
resources in their unimproved state or that plus the value of our oppor-
tunities to improve them which should be equalized.
There are many forms of egalitarian ownership and thus many forms
of left-libertarianism. Here are a few possibilities. (1) Natural resources
might be owned in common in the sense that each person is free to use
(but not appropriate) them as long as she is not violating the self-
ownership rights of others. (2) Natural resources might be jointly owned
in the sense that any use, or perhaps only any appropriation, requires
collective (e.g., majority) approval. (3) Unilateral appropriation of 
unappropriated resources may be permitted as long as one pays to the
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2. See G. A. Cohen, Self-Ownership, Freedom, and Equality (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1995), pp. 68, 214.
members of society their per capita share of the full competitive value
(based on supply and demand) of the rights that one claims.3 (4) Unilat-
eral appropriation of unappropriated resources may be permitted as
long as one appropriates no more than is compatible with everyone
having an equally valuable opportunity for a good life.4 Of course, there
are many other possibilities.5
There are, thus, many forms of left-libertarianism, just as there are
many forms of other first order normative doctrines (such as utilitarian-
ism and contractualism). All versions are, however, committed to full
self-ownership and to some kind of egalitarian ownership of natural
resources.
II. The Determinacy of Full Self-Ownership
Fried and others have suggested that the notion of full self-ownership 
is inherently indeterminate and has few concrete implications (e.g.,
because it can be interpreted in a variety of incompatible ways). We shall
argue, however, that, although the notion has some indeterminacy, it has
a significant determinate core.
In order to establish this relative determinacy, we shall define full
ownership using the following terminology. For a given object, first order
property rights concern the permissible uses of the object. “Use” is here
understood broadly to include all the ways that persons can physically
impact upon an object, including effects that are unforeseen. Posses-
sion, occupation, incursion, and intrusion are forms of use in this 
stipulative sense.
Full private ownership of an object consists of a full set of the follow-
ing ownership rights: (1) control rights over the use of the object; (2) rights
to compensation if someone uses the object without one’s permission;
(3) enforcement rights (to prevent the violation of these rights or to
extract compensation owed for past violation); (4) rights to transfer these
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3. Something like this is defended in Hillel Steiner, An Essay on Rights (Cambridge,
Mass.: Blackwell Publishing, 1994).
4. Something like this is defended in Michael Otsuka, Libertarianism without Inequal-
ity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).
5. We here construe egalitarianism broadly so as to include leximin. Philippe Van Parijs
invokes leximin in his left-libertarian theory of justice. See Philippe Van Parijs, Real
Freedom for All (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
rights to others (by sale, rental, gift, or loan); and (5) immunity to the
nonconsensual loss of any of the rights of ownership.6
Full ownership, like ownership generally, is simply a bundle of partic-
ular rights. There is nothing magical about full ownership. It is simply
(roughly) the logically strongest set of ownership rights over a thing that
a person can have compatibly with others having such rights over every-
thing else.7 Ownership can come in various degrees and forms (and few,
if any, legal systems recognize full ownership in this logical sense). One
can, for example, have full control rights over a thing without having the
other rights. Left-libertarianism does not claim that ownership is either
all or nothing. It claims that, as a matter of normative fact, agents (at
least roughly) fully own themselves as opposed to not at all or something
significantly weaker.8 This claim, of course, is controversial, but its
defense is beyond the scope of this article.
In her review, Fried suggests (e.g., p. 72) that libertarians fail to take
due account of the decomposability (fragmentability) of ownership
implicit in Hohfeldian and Legal Realist analysis. No doubt some
(perhaps many) libertarians have failed to recognize that property rights
are indeed decomposable, but we fully accept this decomposability.9
Fried’s real target, we believe, is the view that full self-ownership has 
a relatively determinate content. We shall argue that, even though 
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6. Other rights standardly associated with the concept of ownership are, we believe,
implied by these five rights. Rights of transfer, control, and immunity, for example, imply
a right to income from one’s property, where this latter right is understood as the right to
all one can get others to pay, consistent with their rights, from one’s choice to rent or sell
this property.
7. We here modify and build upon the explication of full self-ownership given by
Cohen, Self-Ownership, Freedom, and Equality, pp. 213–17. Also, for simplicity, we here
ignore an important qualification: Assuming that one loses some rights when one violates
the rights of others, full self-ownership is incompatible with someone else owning the rest
of the world and denying the agent permission to occupy any space (since the agent would
be trespassing and lose some rights). A more careful formulation of full ownership is as the
logically strongest set of ownership rights over a thing that a person can have compatibly
with others having such rights over everything else and granting her permission to occupy
the space she occupies.
8. Given the decomposability of full ownership, those who—despite the historical
reality of slavery—find the notion of ownership of persons bizarre can simply substitute
the relevant bundle of rights.
9. Indeed, one of us has written at length on the subject. See Hillel Steiner, “Working
Rights,” in M. H. Kramer, N. E. Simmonds, and H. Steiner, A Debate over Rights (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1998).
ownership generally, and full ownership in particular, is decomposable,
full self-ownership has a relatively determinate content.
The above five kinds of ownership right can come in different
strengths and the elements need not all be present in any particular
bundle of ownership rights. We claim, however, that there is a relatively
determinate set of full ownership rights. In this context, it is important
to keep in mind that full ownership is not the strongest set of ownership
rights that a person can have in a thing. It is rather the strongest set of
such rights that is compatible with other people having the same rights
over other things. More specifically, full self-ownership is the logically
strongest set of ownership rights that one can have over one’s person that
is compatible with someone else having the same kind of ownership
rights over everything else in the world. Here and throughout, we take
one set of rights to be logically stronger than another set if and only if
the first contains all the rights of the second plus some additional ones.
Our claim is that, although full self-ownership involves some undeni-
able indeterminacy, it still has enough content to have significant nor-
mative force. Let us start by identifying the indeterminacy, which arises
because there is no uniquely strongest set of ownership rights. This is so
because strengthening one person’s compensation or enforcement
rights weakens the immunity to loss of another person. Thus, there is no
unique maximally strong set of ownership rights. Everyone could have
very strong compensation and enforcement rights against those who
violate their rights, but this would entail that everyone has a less than
maximal immunity to loss of their ownership rights (since their liberty
to use the things they own and the security against interference from
others would be reduced when they violate the rights of others). Alter-
natively (to pick the other extreme), everyone could have very weak 
compensation and enforcement rights, while having a relatively strong
immunity to loss. Neither set of rights is unequivocally stronger than the
other.
The notion of full ownership is thus indeterminate with respect to
compensation rights, enforcement rights, and immunity to loss when 
a person uses an object over which another has unwaived ownership
rights. Full ownership can, that is, be interpreted in various ways with
respect to the implications of one person violating the rights of another.
We claim that the indeterminacy generated by compensation rights
and enforcement rights nonetheless leaves a significant amount of
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determinacy in the concept of full ownership. In particular, full owner-
ship is quite determinate with respect to its implications where the owner
has not made, and is not in the process of making, incursions onto the
property of others without their consent. In that case, the full owner of an
object has full control rights, that is, (1) a full liberty to use the object (i.e.,
she is permitted to use the owned object as long as she has the permis-
sion of the owners of any other objects thereby used), and (2) a full secu-
rity right over use of that object (i.e., no one else may use the object
without her permission). There is no indeterminacy here.10
It is important to note that this determinacy depends crucially on the
fact that we are appealing to full ownership rights, and not to rights gen-
erally. If all possible rights were taken into account, then there would
indeed be a radical indeterminacy. One person’s security right against
others smashing “her” car would conflict with the liberty of others to use
their hammers to smash it. This conflict, however, does not arise for
ownership rights. The (control-right) liberty to use a hammer one owns
does not conflict with anyone’s (control-right) security-right over a car
she owns. This is because the liberty of use that is included in ownership
rights does not entail that one may use the owned object in any way that
one wants. It is not a general liberty of action. It only ensures that the
use of the hammer as such is permissible (i.e., the mere fact that the
owner uses the hammer without anyone else’s permission does not
establish that such use is wrong). In order to be permissible, any partic-
ular act of using the hammer must also permissibly use all the other
objects involved in that act (e.g., the car smashed). Hence, there is no
conflict between one person’s security rights over one object and
another person’s liberty rights over another. Full self-ownership—a
strongest set of ownership rights that a person can have over herself
compatible others having the same rights over everything else in the
world—thus determinately gives each person full security rights and full
liberty rights over her person.
There is, however, an additional source of indeterminacy that we must
recognize. Call the conception of full self-ownership characterized above
“full self-ownership in the strict sense.” It has some rather radical imp-
lications. These include that one’s self-ownership is violated when
206 Philosophy & Public Affairs
10. We also claim that full ownership determinately includes full transfer rights, but for
brevity we omit this issue here.
another agent performs an action for which (1) there is only a very small
probability that it will result in an incursion against oneself; (2) if there
is an incursion, the harm to oneself will be trivial; (3) the harm was not
reasonably foreseeable; and (4) the benefits to others of performing the
action are enormous (e.g., avoidance of social catastrophe). Thus, for
example, strict full ownership of my body is violated, if, in the process of
putting out a dangerous fire, you inadvertently send a small bit of stone
one hundred yards away, where it lightly flicks my hand. Most people
with strong libertarian inclinations will want to reject these implications
and thus reject full self-ownership in the strict sense.11
It is therefore useful to distinguish between strict libertarianism,
which endorses full self-ownership in the strict sense, and a looser kind
of libertarianism, which requires endorsement of full self-ownership 
in a looser sense. For present purposes, let us count a form of self-
ownership as full (in the looser sense) if and only if it agrees with full
ownership in the strict sense, except perhaps when one or more of the
above four conditions is satisfied. This introduces additional indetermi-
nacy in the notion of full ownership (since the implications are left open
when one of the four conditions is satisfied), but it still leaves a lot of 
significant content. For example, self-ownership determinately rules 
out actions that are foreseeably highly likely to cause incursions on one’s
person that will significantly harm one and where avoidance of a social
catastrophe is not at issue.
In summary, although there is some significant indeterminacy in 
the notion of full self-ownership in the strict sense, and some further
indeterminacy in the more relevant notion of full self-ownership in the
loose sense, that leaves a very significant core to the notion of full 
self-ownership. It is thus a mistake to dismiss this notion as having no
determinate content.
The relative determinacy of the concept of full self-ownership evi-
dently leaves completely open whether, as a matter of normative fact,
agents are full self-owners. Why, one might ask, should we believe that
agents are full self-owners in even the loose sense, as opposed to some
weaker sense or not at all? This, of course, is a difficult issue, and we
cannot here give an adequate answer. Part of the answer is that there is
something theoretically plausible about the thesis of self-ownership:
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11. See Otsuka, Libertarianism without Inequality, ch. 1, sec. I.
we—and not others—are morally in charge of our bodies and our
persons. It is wrong to kill us, strike us, have sex with us, or remove our
body parts without our permission. Moreover, full self-ownership is both
plausible in the abstract (we are fully in charge of our persons) and has
a theoretical simplicity. To be sure, the plausibility of a principle does not
depend solely on its theoretical attractiveness. It also depends on the
plausibility of its concrete implications. Full self-ownership admittedly
has some counterintuitive implications (e.g., the legitimacy of voluntary
slavery and the absence of a legally enforceable duty to provide highly
desirable personal services under certain circumstances). This, however,
is true of all principles. A full defense of a principle requires a balancing
of the abstract theoretical considerations with the plausibility of the con-
crete implications (e.g., as in reflective equilibrium). Our claim, unde-
fended here, is that at least loose full self-ownership is justified by such
a balancing procedure.
III. Self-Ownership and World Ownership
Left-libertarians hold that, as a matter of natural right, agents initially
fully own themselves and natural resources are owned in some egalitar-
ian manner. It is important to keep in mind that these are two indepen-
dent assumptions. Contrary to what Fried suggests,12 left-libertarians do
not all hold that the egalitarian ownership of natural resources follows
from their nonegalitarian libertarian commitments. We think it would,
for example, be a mistake to hold that egalitarianism follows from uni-
versal full self-ownership, since the latter is compatible with a variety of
nonegalitarian forms of ownership of natural resources.13 Instead, left-
libertarians invoke egalitarian ownership of natural resources as an
independent principle.
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12. See Fried, p. 68: “Notwithstanding (or perhaps because of) the egalitarian conclu-
sions to which they have been led, left-libertarians have taken great pains to stress that
that outcome does not reflect any attachment to broad-based egalitarianism per se, but
simply follows from their libertarian commitments. . . .”
13. It is worth noting that, if all physical space is a natural resource, then full self-
ownership sets some clear, albeit modest, constraints on the appropriation of natural
resources, since it stands in the way of the appropriation of the space that other people
involuntarily occupy. This obviously falls far short of the claim that full self-ownership
implies egalitarian world-ownership.
To this, it may be replied that, although the two principles may be log-
ically compatible, there is no coherence in the overall position.14 If coher-
ence requires that the justification for each of one’s principles appeal to
the same set of considerations, this may be correct, but then there is little
reason to require coherence so understood. Left-libertarianism holds
that there is a very significant difference in the moral status of agents
(self-directing beings with full moral standing) and natural resources
(resources that have no moral standing and which were created by no
[non-divine] agent). About the former they maintain that full self-
ownership is the most appropriate reflection of the status (e.g., because
it explains/grounds the intuitive wrongness of various forms of non-
consensual interference with bodily integrity), and about the latter they
independently maintain that egalitarian ownership is the most defensi-
ble stance.
Conceding that left-libertarian theories may have succeeded in 
vindicating the possibility of justifying more egalitarian redistribution
than has standardly been assumed possible without violating the self-
ownership constraint, Fried claims that there is no room in left-
libertarian theory to compensate for unchosen inequalities in personal
endowments.15 For although such compensating transfers might be 
justified by invoking “intuitions of fairness,” and although they might
not be incompatible with the self-ownership constraint (i.e., because
funded by taxes on natural resource values), those intuitions themselves
cannot, she claims, be anchored in basic left-libertarian principles and
look to be ones of purely egalitarian provenance. As such, it is claimed,
their endorsement by left-libertarianism suggests, again, that it amounts
to little more than “liberal egalitarianism in drag.”
The first point to note in reply is that some left-libertarians (e.g.,
Steiner) argue that unchosen germ-line genetic information is a natural
resource and thus among the items subject to egalitarian ownership.
That is, this position derives compensation for unequal personal endow-
ments from egalitarian ownership of natural resources. Other versions
of left-libertarianism appeal, as Fried says, to intuitions of fairness to
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14. See Mathias Risse, “Does Left-Libertarianism Have Coherent Foundations?” 
Politics, Philosophy, and Economics 3 (2004): 337–65.
15. See Fried, p. 88: “But the one thing Lockean libertarianism clearly seems to rule out
is a combined tax and transfer scheme designed to compensate individuals for unchosen
inequalities in personal endowments.”
justify the claim that natural resources are to be divided so as to promote
effective equality (and thus provide at least partial compensation for
unequal unchosen person endowments). This does indeed make them
a form of liberal egalitarianism. The proponents, however, are not in
drag. They are proud, card-carrying liberal egalitarians. Moreover, as we
shall now argue, they are a distinctive kind of liberal egalitarian.
IV. Left-Libertarianism as a Version of Liberal Egalitarianism
Fried questions the distinctness of left-libertarianism for two reasons.
First, she maintains that “the label ‘left-libertarianism’ houses disparate
moral intuitions that share little but a name” (p. 78). Hence it is a label
that identifies a group of theorists whose positions fail to cohere with one
another’s in any meaningful way.16 Second, she objects that many left-
libertarians endorse a set of moral and political commitments that are
indistinguishable from those of other, more familiar liberal egalitarians
such as Rawls and Dworkin. This is problematic, she claims, given that
left-libertarians aim to stake out “a middle ground between the two
dominant strains of contemporary political philosophy: the conven-
tional libertarianism of those such as Robert Nozick on the right, and the
egalitarianism of those such as Rawls, Dworkin, and Sen on the left” (p.
67). One might also wonder, as Fried does, why one should “bother with
left-libertarianism at all” if it simply converges on more conventional
forms of liberal egalitarianism (p. 91).
In reply to the charge of failure of coherence, we note that, like most
other “isms” in moral and political philosophy, left-libertarianism is a
family of theories, with the usual implications of what that means:
namely, that member theories are strung out along a spectrum, or even
several spectrums, with strong mutual affinities, but also conflicting par-
ticular conceptions of the overarching concept. Thus, different versions
of left-libertarianism invoke different conceptions of “near-full” self-
ownership and different conceptions of egalitarian ownership of natural
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16. This differs from the charge of incoherence raised in the previous section. There the
accusation was that any given left-libertarian individual’s own principles fail to cohere with
one another. Here the charge is that the views of different so-called left-libertarians fail
sufficiently to cohere with one another for the label “left-libertarian” meaningfully to apply
to them all. The former charge is one of intrapersonal incoherence, whereas the latter is
one of interpersonal incoherence.
resources. Nonetheless, they are all committed to near-full self-
ownership and to the rejection of nonegalitarian forms of ownership of
natural resources. Left-libertarianism is no less uniform in this regard
than egalitarianism, consequentialism, and liberalism. Fried, for
example, evinces no corresponding qualms about the concept of “liberal
egalitarianism,” which is liberally employed throughout her piece. 
Yet any study of the writings of those who are categorized as liberal 
egalitarians will reveal a diversity of conceptions, some of which also fall
within the scope of other partially overlapping concepts. This diversity
and overlap is standard for any family of theories and is no less great
than in the case of the concept “left-libertarianism.”17
Consider, then, Fried’s charge that left-libertarianism fails to distin-
guish itself from liberal egalitarianism. We begin by noting that not all
left-libertarians aspire to be less egalitarian than such thinkers as Rawls
and Dworkin. This is an accurate description of the aspirations of many
but by no means all left-libertarians. Some left-libertarians wish to
demonstrate that their libertarian commitments are at least nearly 
fully consistent with the egalitarianism of people such as Rawls and
Dworkin.18 These left-libertarians seek common ground with liberal egal-
itarians rather than middle ground between them and right-libertarians.
Those left-libertarians who want to occupy the common overlapping
ground with some other liberal egalitarians (i.e., some luck egalitarians)
obviously do not regard it as a criticism that their first-order commit-
ments are virtually indistinguishable from those of these other liberal
egalitarians.
Figure 1 is a rough and ready map of the conceptual space that left-
libertarianism occupies.
As this map indicates, left-libertarianism is both a form of libertari-
anism and a form of liberal egalitarianism. Moreover, the views of some
left-libertarians converge upon, as indicated by the overlap, the views of
some luck egalitarians.
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17. Consider, for example, the internecine “what is equality?” disputes among broadly
liberal egalitarian philosophers such as the “luck egalitarians” Dworkin, G. A. Cohen, and
Richard Arneson, not to mention the dispute between them and other more Rawlsian
liberal egalitarians such as Samuel Scheffler who think that the luck egalitarians are fun-
damentally mistaken in their approach.
18. That is, for example, Otsuka’s aim in Libertarianism without Inequality, ch. 1.
To fill in some of the details of the above schema, the following are a
few salient points of overlap and contrast between left-libertarians and
other liberal egalitarians: () Self-Ownership: Left-libertarians and other
liberal egalitarians tend to agree on the extent of rights to be free of
unconsented-to-incursions on one’s person. But left-libertarians affirm,
in contrast with most other liberal egalitarians, the extensive alienabil-
ity of rights of self-ownership, encompassing, for example, the right 
to sell oneself into onerous servitude or even permanent slavery.21
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Luck Egalitarians19
Liberals
Right
Libertarians
Rawlsians Left
Egalitarians
Liberal Egalitarians
Strict Egalitarians20
19. Here we adopt Elizabeth Anderson’s label for such egalitarians as Dworkin, Cohen,
Arneson, and Rakowski. See Elizabeth Anderson, “What is the Point of Equality?” Ethics 109
(1999): 287–337. Dworkin himself describes his view as a “third way” between traditional
forms of egalitarianism and more libertarian views that place an emphasis on responsi-
bility and choice. See Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 2000), pp. 1, 7. It is therefore not surprising that one will find overlap between
his position and those of left-libertarians, who are similarly motivated.
20. This label refers to those egalitarians, if any, for whom equality takes precedence
over all other values or principles such as self-ownership, liberty, or efficiency.
21. Of course, many will view the right to sell oneself into slavery as highly implausi-
ble. We believe, however, that the affirmation of this right of transfer is more in keeping
with our status as autonomous, rational choosers than its denial. To whom would a duty
not to sell oneself into slavery be owed? See Peter Vallentyne, “Left-Libertarianism: A
Primer,” in Left-Libertarianism and Its Critics: The Contemporary Debate, ed. Vallentyne
and Steiner; Steiner, An Essay on Rights, pp. 232–33; and Otsuka, Libertarianism without
Inequality, ch. 6 (esp. pp. 126–27). See also A. John Simmons’s defense of the alienability of
rights in On the Edge of Anarchy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp.
140–43.
Figure 1
(2) Equality: A number of left-libertarians are less egalitarian than other
liberal egalitarians such as Rawls and Dworkin.22 This is traceable both
to their primary focus on the equalization of entitlements to natural
resources as opposed to physical and mental capacities or well-being
and to their affirmation of the priority of self-ownership over equality
when the two come into conflict. Left-libertarians almost universally
tend, however, to be more egalitarian than many other liberal egalitari-
ans insofar as their egalitarian principles have global rather than soci-
etal scope (e.g., require some kind of equalization for all individuals in
the world).
Those left-libertarians who want to occupy common ground with
other liberal egalitarians must face the “Why bother?” challenge raised
above. There are at least two answers to this question: First, left-
libertarians have achieved something of significance if they are able to
disarm right-libertarians by demonstrating that a strongly egalitarian
version of liberal egalitarianism is consistent with the same commit-
ments to self-ownership as those of right-libertarians, as Fried acknowl-
edges.23 Second, even when their first-order views converge on those 
of other liberal egalitarians, the normative focus of left-libertarians
remains distinct from, and in many respects more promising than, the
normative focus of Rawlsian liberal egalitarians. The first answer is self-
explanatory. The second answer, however, requires some elaboration.
Left-libertarians have a shared normative focus on natural rights of
ownership in self and in world: that is, on the question of what natural
rights of self-ownership persons possess and on the question of what
rights over natural resources in a state of nature such self-owners can
come to acquire. Rawlsian liberal egalitarians, by contrast, share a nor-
mative focus on the question of the fair division of the fruits of social
cooperation among people who are regarded as free and equal. Left-
libertarians regard the question of the conditions under which natural
resources may be acquired as prior to the question of the division of the
fruits of social cooperation.24 Or at least they think that the answer to the
latter question must be sensitive to the question of the legitimacy of our
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22. But others are no less egalitarian, as noted above.
23. See Fried, p. 69.
24. The question of the conditions under which natural resources may be acquired is
also in some sense prior to that of the conditions under which artifacts may be owned, for
the following reason: all artifacts have, among their several production factors, some
natural resources, but not vice versa.
claims on those resources that we use to produce these cooperative
fruits. Any complete theory of justice in holdings therefore must include
an answer to the following question: What rights, if any, do individuals
have to acquire property rights in previously unowned natural
resources?
Rawlsians do not address this question, since they regard its answer
as settled by the question of the fair division of the fruits of social coop-
eration in the context of societies many generations removed from acts
of original acquisition. Left-libertarians, however, insist that the ques-
tion of original acquisition cannot be dismissed on these grounds and
argue that the egalitarian principle of justice in acquisition that they
endorse casts a shadow over the legitimacy of claims of ownership by 
all subsequent generations. On one left-libertarian interpretation, for
example, the Lockean “enough and as good” proviso calls for members
of each generation to ensure that, at their deaths, resources that are at
least as valuable as those they have acquired lapse back into a state of
nonownership so that the next generation has opportunities to acquire
unowned resources which are at least as valuable as theirs. Inequalities
in holdings in the present-day actual world are unjust insofar as they fail
to conform to such an intergenerational principle of justice in acquisi-
tion.25 The distinctive normative focus of left-libertarians, that is, renders
salient certain morally significant facts that Rawlsians overlook. From
the point of view of rights of acquisition of unowned resources, the case
for equality is different from and arguably more compelling than a Rawl-
sian case that focuses on a fair division of the fruits of social coopera-
tion: although the more productively talented might plausibly lay claim
to a greater share of these fruits by virtue of their greater contribution to
their production, it is much less plausible for them to maintain that their
superior talent justifies their acquisition of a greater-than-equal share of
unowned worldly resources.26 The distinctive left-libertarian focus also
gives rise to substantive differences such as the following: the left-
libertarian does not assume that strongly egalitarian principles of 
distributive justice are to be confined to a territorially closed society of
social cooperators, unlike the Rawlsian.27 Rather, since territories just are
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natural resources, an emphasis on ownership of resources in a pre-
political state of nature as a primary question naturally leads to princi-
ples that are global rather than societal in scope.28
In sum, left-libertarianism is no less coherent than many other 
families of theories such as liberal egalitarianism. Moreover, the left-
libertarians’ distinctive focus on ownership of self and egalitarian 
ownership of natural resources provides a firmer foundation for the
common ground they share with other liberal egalitarians and gives rise
to substantive differences as well.
V. Conclusion
We have not attempted the difficult task of defending left-libertarianism
on normative grounds. Like any normative theory, it is subject to several
deep and troubling objections. Here we have focused on the easier task
of defending the claim that it is a coherent, relatively determinate, dis-
tinct alternative to existing forms of liberal egalitarianism.
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